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The Baltic Sea: A region beyond security?
Pertti Joenniemi
Zusammenfassung
Sicherheitsfragen nehmen eine neue Position und Bedeutung auf der
Agenda der Ostseeregion ein. Um die Stellung der Region innerhalb
Europas weiter zu stärken, ist es notwendig und angebracht, über die
bisherigen Anfänge hinauszudenken. Das Vorhaben ist nach wie vor
durchführbar, da feststeht, dass der Zusammenhalt in der Region wachsen
und sie somit stabiler werden wird. Die Zukunft der Beziehungen zwischen
der EU und Rußland stellt jedoch den Haken an der Sache dar, und es
scheint so, als gliche es einem beispiellosen Kunststück, dieses Problem zu
lösen. Um die Möglichkeiten, die sich aus der Situation nach dem Konflikt
ergeben haben, wirklich zu nutzen, ist es notwendig, einige der bisher
gehegten Prinzipien, hinter sich zu lassen, die die Schaffung des politischen
Raumes um die Ostsee herum gelenkt haben.
Pertti Joenniemi is Senior Research Fellow at the Copenhagen Peace
Research Institute (COPRI).
Introduction
For some years now, Northern Europe - specially the Baltic Sea region -
has conveyed a dual image. Due to the imbroglio between Russia and the
Balts, the Baltic Sea region has stood out as one of the few areas in Europe
where serious military conflict is still conceivable. Despite being a trouble
spot, which makes it interesting for academic analysis, the Baltic Sea region
has become far more cooperative. In line with general developments in
Northern Europe, it has become a densely regionalized area with ample
border-transcending arrangements, including a number of ‘euro-regions’.
These two trends, rapid regionalization and high-pitch securitization, might
be seen as contradictory to one other; to some extent, this may even be the
case. For the most part, the negative ‘othering’ (a means of defining and
securing one’s own positive identity through the stigmatization of an ‘other’)
that underpins security talks does not go hand-in-hand with close
cooperation, but it is also obvious that security has contributed to
regionalization and the re-conceptualization of borders in the Baltic Sea
area. The eminence of security on the political agendas has not only been
conducive to oppositional formations, exclusionary politics and clear-cut
lines of demarcation; it has also spurred various cooperative endeavors.
The move from zero-sum and more militaristic views of security has
facilitated various joint, regional military endeavors, such as annual ‘rescue
at sea’ type of operations carried out by the naval forces in the region. In
fact, the rather ‘soft’ security thinking, which has become dominant, has led
to the encouragement of various ‘bottom-up’-type endeavors, networking
and local solutions. Consequently, borders have become blurred and the
door has been opened to a pluralistic political landscape, one that includes
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security cooperation.
However, the constellation that has brought about rather favorable results
appears to change as the essential aspects of security change; security is
becoming increasingly de-territorialized and less conducive to
regionalization. The Baltic Sea region has not been directly impacted by the
events of “9/11” and the ‘war against terrorism’, but the consequences seem
nonetheless crucial. They pertain more generally to the Clausewitzian
comprehension of war; anarchy as a basic condition in the relations
between states is rapidly declining in credibility and is being replaced by
more cooperative, norm-based, hierarchic and cosmopolitan aspirations (as
well as disagreements in that context). More particularly, the reason for
rethinking security and its impact on the unfolding of political space around
the Baltic Rim, including the relationship between security and
regionalization, consists of Russia indicating that it is becoming a ‘partner’
in the context of the new, norm-based cosmopolitan system. With Russia no
longer resisting the enlargement of NATO and now being one of the ‘ins’,
there is much less justification for perceiving the Baltic Sea area as a
potential trouble spot. What is then – with ‘hard’ security issues declining in
salience – the role of the security argument? Does the weakening and
change of security also undermine efforts of regionalization or is the effect,
in fact, an opposite one, amounting to an even more blurred and
de-bordered political landscape as a consequence of regionalization set
free and liberated from its bonds to security? There is obviously an
opportunity as well as a necessity for significant new thinking, but the
re-conceptualization of relationships in the Baltic Sea region can also take
somewhat unexpected and unconventional forms; this is the issue that this
contribution aims to exploring.
Good News Dominates
It appears opportune, in order to investigate the current trends and
constellations, to commence by reviewing the traditional setting around the
Baltic Rim, and in particular the way security has affected the unfolding of
political space.
Historically, the situation in the Baltic Sea area has been more divisive than
unifying. War, conflicts and changing power political constellations were
prevalent in the region; only the Hanseatic Period between the 13th and the
15th century stands out as a period when the unifying forces had an upper
hand. The Nordic area constitutes another exception, with its prevailing
interstate violence and something of a permanent ‘war system’1 – until the
beginning of the 19th century, when war became inconceivable as a means
for resolving conflicts. Due to an emerging ‘we-feeling’ that transcended
previous national borders without relocating them as a joint Scandinavian
and later Nordic identity, interstate wars became unthinkable. By creating
an area of ‘low tension’, this system contributed to some extent to keeping
major power rivalry and power politics out of the region, but failed to spread
outside the Nordics themselves2. The Nordic policies also contributed to the
salience of the Baltic Sea area during the period of the Cold War as a
semi-periphery in a Europe colored by the conflict between East and West.
As the Cold War petered out toward the end of the 1980s, the canonical
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threats disappeared and were replaced by more region-specific
constellations. The more specific changes consisted of German unification,
followed by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the demise of the Soviet
Union and the re-establishment of independence in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania. The changes have generally remained peaceful, with the
exception of some violent clashes in Lithuania and Latvia in 1991, which
were caused mainly by the then Soviet Ministry of Interior troops. Tensions,
such as those between Poland and Lithuania, have given way to a
normalization of relations; even the Kaliningrad ‘conundrum’ has become a
bone of contention between the EU and Russia in terms of transactions and
openness, rather than as an old-fashioned territorial and power political
conflict pertaining to military issues.3
More generally, the superpower overlay that also aspired to arrange all
relations in the Baltic Sea area in correspondence with the overarching
bipolarity has broken down: its demise led to the emergence of decidedly
more differentiated and cooperative relations. It has been implied that there
has been far more good news than bad ones. Actually, the change has
been rather dramatic and thorough, given that the Baltic Sea area had little
previous experience of region-building, networking, cross-border
cooperation and such like. In fact, the region promptly became a laboratory
of innovative ways to deal with the divisive nature of borders. Novel politics
developed at various levels: below the states, on the level of multilateral
agreement among states and on the level of states. In a relative short time,
the region has, subsequently, become one of the most regionalized parts of
Europe.4 The instruments that were developed range from very small and
local ones to rather large and mainly statist arrangements such as the
Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), established in 1992. The guiding
principle has become much more one of inclusion rather than exclusion;
new formations have emerged that have little to do with security, although
security has indeed managed to hold at least some of its ground.
From ‘Hard’ to ‘Soft’ Security
Whilst the outcome has been relatively peaceable, the perception prevailed
for quite some time that there is potential for serious conflicts in the region.
They pertained to various relics, such as the Russian troops, bases and
installations that either remained in the Baltic countries or were relocated in
the Baltic Sea area as part of Russia’s withdrawal from Central Europe.
With the redrawing of borders, a number of territorial disputes emerged,
although almost all of them – with a couple of minor exceptions – were
settled by negotiations.5
Russia’s relations with the three Baltic countries, above all Estonia and
Latvia, have stood out as a major source of friction. The talk of ‘near
abroads’ has been seen as indicating that Russia has problems in
accepting the independence of the Balts; Russia remained concerned about
the treatment of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. The
Balts felt insecure, aspired for western security guarantees in the form of a
membership in NATO – and sometimes added to the negative atmosphere
by their less than friendly statements.
In retrospect, however, the conflicts have been defused and the
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rapprochement appears to be of an enduring kind. Russia has increasingly
recognized that the Baltic countries do exist and that they will prevail as
independent entities. Moreover, it has even tacitly accepted NATO’s
enlargement to the Baltic countries, a move endorsed at the NATO summit
in Prague in autumn 2002. Such a tolerance changes the discourse
profoundly. With the enlargement issue basically off the agenda, there will
be much less friction in Russian-Baltic relations and in relations between
Russia and the Western powers. In fact, the security argument gets
seriously deflated; it is less functional for Russia, and Baltic efforts of
securitizing Russia are profoundly undermined. This provides a further
boost for the rethinking that has already been underway in the Baltic
countries. Consequently, the negative ‘othering’ of Russia has become
decidedly less common. Arguments are changing considerably, as indicated
for example by Estonia’s “Vienna Document” on the exchange of
information on defense planning; “Estonia does not see any military threat
to its security, either now or in the foreseeable future”.6
The noticeable improvements pertain to a broad variety of factors. Above
all, there has been both an opportunity and necessity to think differently
about security. The opportunity emerged with the demise of the Cold War,
and a number of actors have contributed to the fact that it has been utilized.
The growing importance and enlargement of the EU (with Finnish and
Swedish membership in the mid-1990s and an opening up for Polish and
Baltic membership) has upgraded economic and societal issues at the
expense of ‘hard’ security.7 In order to be one of the ‘ins’, one must have
economic potential as well as societal and administrative competence. Even
NATO’s enlargement appears to have been conducive to a downgrading of
negative ‘othering’ among Russia and the Balts; the prerequisites for good
and cooperative relations or – in the case of the Balts – a prospective
membership pertain to orderly behavior, lack of conflicts with neighbors as
well as the abstention from territorial demands. The enlargement of the
alliance has been premised on enhancing European security as a whole
and avoiding new dividing lines.8 The aspired security architecture has not
been grounded in a dual logic of NATO facing some other similar formation.
There is no sharp division into ‘us’ and ‘them’, and in many cases Russia
has been invited to join the common endeavors in counteracting instability
and unpredictable events.
More generally, there has been a development away from zero-sum and
more militaristic views of security towards more inclusive and cooperative
understandings. Concepts such as ‘comprehensive’, ‘cooperative’ and ‘soft’
security have procured a rather prominent place on the regional agendas.9
By the same token, the security of the Baltic Sea area has increasingly
been organized around a series of norms that are also widely applicable
elsewhere in international politics. The various problems, such as the lack
of respect for human rights and minority rights, may thus be seen as having
a region-specific appearance, but they are expected to be solved in a
cooperative fashion by adhere to a series of neo-Kantian and cosmopolitan
norms. Bodies such as the UN, OSCE and the EU have all contributed in
the policy field to the entrenchment and maintenance of these norms; the
CBSS – in particular through the institution of the Commissioner on
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights10 – has been the dominant
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region-specific body in this respect.
Towards a Post-Security Agenda
Security, as an argument, appears to have lost in centrality. It has become
less significant as a formative principle. By the same token, new
approaches have gained considerable prominence within the discourse,
although the more traditional ways of conceiving security have by no means
totally disappeared. Notably, the dominant discursive principles have
become conducive to overlapping spaces. They have contributed to
transforming previously hard edges to rather soft, cooperation-oriented
borders and zones of contact, rather than bringing about divisions of an
inside-out-type. The prime identities have become multiple rather than
remaining singular, and they appear to be formed in an unintended fashion
through extensive processes of interaction across previous borderlines and
less than before through explicit endeavors of identity-formation within
clearly bordered spaces.
The actors of the region have – hitherto – been void of joint and explicit
policies vis-à-vis the Baltic Sea region. The previous plurality might continue
for some time, although the pressure to develop joint policies in spheres
such as energy supply, high-speed rail links, shipping (introduction of ‘fast
lanes’) or environmental protection is increasing rapidly; there are also
compelling reasons to arrive at joint views on the development of the region
at large – if the aim to gain subjectivity rather than react to policies decided
upon elsewhere.
Above all, the fact that the countries of the region are increasingly within the
sphere of the EU – Russia is the main exception –, speaks for a process
towards more uniform and coordinated policies (for the first time since the
Hanseatic harmonization of trading rules and regulations). However, the
multilayered nature of the region will certainly prevail. The region will still
exceed the external borders of the European Union, but less so than
previously with Russia as the only crucial outsider (Norway and Iceland
tend to negotiate and handle their EU relationship in other contexts). The
future of the Baltic Sea region is thus heavily dependent on the processes
and dynamics within the EU, on the ability of the actors of the region to join
forces in that context, and on the unfolding of the relationship between the
EU and Russia. The recent discussion on which types of ships should be
allowed to enter the Baltic Sea during icy conditions bears witness to this.
The region’s EU members had to make up their minds first, which was then
followed by an EU decision on the matter, which in turn had to be
negotiated with Russia. The process is currently underway, resulting in all
probability into joint norms concerning the requirement placed on
capabilities of ships to manage under hard and icy conditions.
With security increasingly in the background, the EU-Russia-relationship
assumes a new meaning and may acquire additional depth, particularly in
the Baltic Sea area. Russia clearly aspires for a more inclusive posture, but
has so far been unable to articulate such an aspiration in terms of
well-formulated and thoroughly considered initiatives and policies. The EU
has, for its part, focused primarily on implementing a set of policies to
govern its increasingly large eastern borders, policies that seem to exclude
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as much as they include. The broader aspirations seem to remain unsettled.
The deliberation on a ‘Wider Europe’ (a process underway to deepen the
Union’s neighborhood policies based on an UK initiative) has to be
complemented by more region-specific considerations. There are numerous
indications that an interesting contention is destined to arise: to what extent
are the policies of the Union to be defined by the established member
countries and how much scope do the new members to influence the
policies to be pursued? Poland’s ideas concerning an ‘Eastern Dimension’
demonstrate that the newcomers have ideas and are interested in pursuing
them in a proper context.
The emerging contention is basically a positive one. It is to be welcomed –
among other reasons – because it prompts discussion and debate at a
juncture when fresh ideas, re-thinking and dynamism are in great demand.
Ideas and visions are obviously required, alongside considerations on
functions, institutions, interests and means such as budgets. Moreover,
such activities may be necessary in order to safeguard a certain position for
Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region on the Union’s agenda. Securing
the interest of the region is warranted, because the EU currently tends to
prioritize and attend to other issues – such as the need to install joint
foreign and security policies as well as the broad variety of issues pertaining
to the convent and the future essence of the EU.
The Core Conundrum
In some cases, the ‘new’ might emerge from the application of ideas and
policies that are already available. The accessible EU instruments allow for
solutions such as the establishment of a free trade area around the Baltic
Rim or the binding of region by a set of associate memberships. Ideas
along these lines have recently been voiced. However, the really sensitive
question is, “Could some of the sub-regions of those membership
candidates – such as Kaliningrad – assume a qualitatively different
relationship to the EU than the countries of which they are part?” Does the
borderline between the integrated and the non-integrated have to follow
clearly demarcated lines or can one envisage some in-between-solutions on
a sub-regional basis – a kind of regionally designed EU relationship? Is the
Baltic Sea region to be thought of as consisting of a strictly uniform set of
rules applicable for everybody without exception, or is there room for
plurality and experimentation with a different set of principles being
introduced in the case of some sub-regional actors?
The modern period, in which security is conducive to clear-cut lines
between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’, rendered such questions largely
nonsensical. However, the new overall logic of the EU-Russia-relationship
now decidedly invites such questions. They have gained added legitimacy
and can no longer be dismissed as easily as before. Ideas pertaining to
plurality and a certain fuzziness – as offering solutions in the case of the
EU-Russia-relationship – are not slighted with the same determination as
before, although they are still far from having occupied a position on any
official agenda. Not even the actors of the region have yet firmly addressed
the question of blurring the lines of inclusion and exclusion. Admittedly, the
issues are undeniably rather difficult to tackle, given the difficult legacy of
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the past.
However, it seems clear that the issues will not fade away. Sooner or later,
they may enter – under the name of proposed ‘test cases’, ‘laboratories’,
‘experiments’ and such like – the EU-Russia agenda in an era of
post-conflict. A kind of paradigmatic stunt seems to be required to devise a
coherent and competent Baltic Sea region policy, a policy premised on
inclusion – even in the case of Russia. Once Russia really decides and
becomes qualified to ‘go Europe’, i.e. settling of the dilemma of Russia
having in some sense to be included without providing EU-membership for
the country as a whole, it will become necessary to consider the formulas
and solutions to use. What would an increasingly inclusive Russia-
EU-relationship then look like, and does the Baltic Sea area offer any
formulas for such a closer relationship to unfold? Moreover, and thinking
further along these lines, what is the role of the smaller actors of the region,
and what kind of overall regional pattern is bound to develop with the
adoption of such a mediating role?
The issues pertaining to the future EU-Russia-relationship undoubtedly do
exist; it is equally clear that many of the answers – even to central issues –
do not. However, it is also obvious that the invitation to solve the
‘conundrum’ is crucial to the future of the Baltic Sea area, to the region’s
prospects for succeeding in relation to Europe’s core, and to the region’s
ability to cope with the increasing competition between the various
European regions in a situation of post-conflict.
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